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PRESUMED CONSENT 
TO ORGAN DONATION: 
A REEVALUATION 
·Maxwell J. Mehlman f 
AS THE DEMAND for transplant organs continues to exceed the 
supply, 1 various methods are being considered for increasing the 
availability of organs from cadaveric donors. One alternative is 
"presumed consent." Currently in the United States,2 a person is 
presumed to be unwilling to donate his or her organs at death unless 
the person, or the family, gives permission. In other words, ours is 
a system of "presumed nonconsent." Under presumed consent, on 
the other hand, the decedent would be presumed to be willing to 
have his or her organs harvested upon death unless he or she, or the 
family, actively objected. 
This paper examines the presumed consent approach from a 
practical, legal and ethical perspective. It concludes that presumed 
consent for harvesting cadaveric organs 3 may be a viable policy 
alternative, but that research in a number of specific areas is needed 
before the policy can be endorsed. 
t Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve 
University 'School of Law. B.A. Reed College, 1970; B.A. Oxford University, 1972; J.D., 
Yale Law School, 1975. This paper was prepared at the request and with the support of the 
National Kidney Foundation. The Author would like to thank Susan Gornik for her re-
search assistance, Odette Wurzburger for her help in obtaining information from Europe, 
Stephen Post for insights into religious viewpoints on organ donation, Rebecca Dresser for 
her comment~ on an earlier draft, and June Omslaer-Sliker for her help in preparing the 
manuscript. The views expressed herein are solely the author's. 
l. Approximately 100,000 people are on waiting lists for organ or tissue transplanta-
tion. Rivers, Buse, Bivins and Horst, Organ and Tissue Procurement in the Acute Care Set-
ting: Principles and Practice-Pan ], 19 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 78, 79 (1990) 
[hereinafter "Rivers"]. There were 9,123 kidney transplants in 1988, but 13,000 patients are 
still waiting for kidney transplants. Jd. The National Heart Transplant Study found that 
14,000 to 15,000 patients need a heart transplant but only 1,647 patients received transplants 
in 1988. Jd. at 78-79. 
2. For information on other countries, see infra notes 55-67, 72-73, 86-88 and accom-
panying·text. 
3. This paper does not address the question of how to increase the supply of transplant 
orgaus from living donors. 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Although the first cadaveric kidney was transplanted in 1936,4 
significant concern with assuring an adequate supply of transplant 
organs only began to be expressed following the marked success of 
renal transplantation in the late 1960's and 1970's.5 
Initially, the United States relied on a purely voluntary ap-
proach to organ donation. The law provided that in general an in-
dividual, or his family, could consent to the removal of organs 
following the individual's death, but that harvesting organs without 
this permission could subject the persons removing the organs to 
civil and criminal penalties.6 Apart from this basic rule, however, 
the legal principles governing consent to donation, which were es-
tablished by state courts and legislatives, varied from state to state. 
The result was a confusing patchwork. Moreover, in many cases 
there were no clear answers to such important questions as what 
should happen if the family disagreed with the wishes of the 
decedent. 7 
To remedy these problems, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform Law began to draft model state legislation in 
1965, and in 1968, approved the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. 8 
By 1972, the UAGA had been adopted throughout the United 
States.9 The UAGA was more than an effort to clarify state law on 
organ donation and to create a uniform set of rules, however; it was 
also an attempt to promote organ donation by simplifying the pro-
4. The first cadaveric kidney transplant was performed in the Soviet Union in 1936 and 
a great deal of experimentation was done in the United States during the 1940's and 1950's. 
Hamilton, Kidney Transplantation: A History, in KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE 5-8 (P. Morris ed. 2d. ed. 1984). 
5. Tissue typing and the use of cyclosporine have contributed to the improved success 
rates. See id. at 8-ll. At the end of the 1980's, one year graft survival rates were 75-85 
percent and patient one-year survival rates were greater than 95 percent. Suranyi and Hall, 
Cu"ent Status of Renal Transplantation, 152 W. J. MED. 687 (1990). 
6. For a discussion of the early history of the disposition of dead bodies, see Naylor, 
The Role of the Family in Cadaveric Organ Procurement, 65 IND. L. J. 167, 169-73 (1989). 
7. See id. at 172-73. See also Silver, The Case for a Post-Monem Organ Draft and a 
Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U.L. REv. 681, 688-93 (1988); Dukerninier and Sand-
ers, Organ Transplantation: A Proposal for Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 N. ENG. 
J. MED. 413, 413-15 (1968). 
8. 8a U.L.A. 16 (1983) [hereinafter "UAGA(1968)"]. 
9. See Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, SA U.L.A. 22-23 (Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 
"UAGA(1987)"]. The UAGA was amended in 1987 in various respects. Id. at 2. A number 
of states have adopted the amendments in whole or in part. See Note, "She's Got Bette Da-
vis['s] Eyes':· Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs under the Takings and 
Due Process Clauses, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 528, 532 (1990) [hereinafter "Columbia Note"]. 
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cess of consent, especially by the decedent. 10 For example, the 
UAGA recognized donor cards as a method by which a person 
. could give legally valid consent to donate organs upon death. 11 
Passage of the UAGA, in short, signified that the nation would no 
longer rely on purely voluntary behavior. Instead, the law would be 
changed to facilitate donation. This approach was known as "en-
couraged voluntarism." 12 
By the mid-1980's, it had become clear that the policy of en-
couraged voluntarism embodied in the UAGA was not producing 
enough donors. Few persons signed donor cards. 13 Even when po-
tential donors with signed cards were identified, hospitals refused to 
harvest their organs without familial consent, and doctors were re-
luctant to approach families to ask for permission. 14 The supply of 
cadaver organs remained limited at the same time that advances in 
transplant technique and immunosuppressive therapy improved the 
success rate of transplants, thereby increasing demand. 15 The con-
tinued shortage of donor organs prompted the search for an alterna-
tive to the principles of encouraged voluntarism. One proposal was 
presumed consent.16 Under the name of "routine salvage," 
10. See, e.g., Columbia Note, supra note 9, at 535 ("(t]he UAGA(1968) did not live up 
to its expectations for encouraging a sufficient supply of organs ... "); Naylor, supra note 6, 
at 173 ("[w]ith the 1968 UAGA and the statutes modeled after it, legislators attempted to 
reduce the family's role and use individual consent in order to procure more organs"). 
11. UAGA(1968) § 4(b). 
12. See Caplan, Organ Transplants: The Cost of Success, 13 HAsTINGs CrR. REP. 23 
(Dec. 1983); Sadler, Sadler, Stason and Stickel, Transplantation: A Case for Consent, 280 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 862 (1969). 
13. A 1985 Gallup Poll found that 27 percent of those surveyed stated that they were 
very likely to donate their organs, but only 17 percent had signed donor cards. THE GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION, INC., GALLUP SURVEY: THE U.S. PUBLIC'S ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION/ORGAN DONATION 19 (1985), cited in Naylor, supra note 6, at 174. 
Manninen and Evans reported that only 14 percent of respondents in a telephone survey of a 
national probability sample stated that they carried donor cards. Manninen and Evans, Pub-
lic Attitudes and Behavior Regarding Organ Donation, 253 J. A.M.A. 3111, 3112 (1985). 
14. See Matas, Arras, Muyskens, Tellis and Vieth, A Proposal for Cadaver Organ Pro-
curement· Routine Removal with Right of Informed Refusal, 10 J. HEALTH PoL, PoL'Y & L. 
231, 232-34 (1985) [hereinafter "Matas 1985"]. 
15. The introduction of cyclosporine in 1983 was particnlarly significant. See U.S. 
DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, 
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY AND THE CONGRESS ON IMMUNOSUPPRESSIVE THERAPIES 10 
(1985). 
16. See, e.g., Note, Refining the Law of Organ Donation: Lessons from the French Law of 
Presumed Consent, 191NT'L L. & PoL. 1013 (1987) [hereinafter "French Note"]; Butler, The 
Law of Human Organ Procurement: A Modest Proposal, I J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 
195 (1985); Matas and Vieth, Presumed Consent for Organ Retrieval, 5 THEOR. MED. 155 
(1984); Starzl, Implied Consent for Cadaveric Organ Donation, 251 J. A.M.A. 1592 (1984); 
Cwiek, Presumed Consent as a Solution to the Organ Shortfall Problem, J. A.M.A. 4 PuB. L. 
F. 81 (1984). 
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Dukeminier and Sanders had advocated this approach back in 1968 
when transplantation successes first began to stimulate interest in 
increasing the supply of donor organs. 17 As envisioned by 
Dukeminier and Sanders, presumed consent would eliminate the 
need for donors to carry donor cards, and for physicians to intrude 
on the family's grief just when they had learned of the death of a 
loved one. In essence, the burden of taking action would shift from 
the surgeon wishing to remove the organs to the donor and his fam-
ily. There would be no need for the doctor to obtain explicit con-
sent to donation; instead, it would be up to the family, or to the 
decedent while still alive, to assert an objection. In the absence of 
an objection, the doctor would be entitled to assume that he had 
permission to retrieve any organs that were needed, and he could 
remove the organs without fear oflegalliability.18 
Despite the possibility that its adoption would provide more ore 
gans for transplantation, the presumed consent idea did not receive 
wide endorsement. David Ogden, then President of the National 
Kidney Foundation, objected that it was "relatively coercive, com-
pared to the more classical freedom of choice that characterizes our 
way of life." 19 Others repeated Paul Ramsey's concern that pre-
sumed consent "would deprive individuals of the exercise of the vir-
tue of generosity."20 The most telling objection, however, was that 
presumed consent was not acceptable to the public. A widely cited 
opinion poll, for example, reported that only 7 percent of the public 
supported the concept.21 Indeed, when a federal task force on or-
gan transplantation rejected presumed consent in 1986, it gave lack 
of popular support as its only reason. 22 
17. Dukeminier and Sanders, supra note 7. 
18. Dukeminier and Sanders wrote: 
At present the surgeon is told: "You may not remove cadaver organs to save the life 
of a living person unless you have obtained consent from the deceased or his next of 
kin." He ought to be told: "You may remove cadaver organs to save the life of a 
living person unless the decedent notified you that he objected or the next of kin 
now objects." 
Id. at 418. 
19. Ogden, Another View on Presumed Consent, 13 HAsTINGS CNTR. REP. 28 (Dec. 
1983). 
20. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 209-10 (1970), cited in, e.g., Steinbrook, Kid-
neys for Transplantation, 6 J. HEALTH PoL., PoL'Y & L. 504, 510-511 (1981). 
21. Manninen & Evans, supra note 13, at 3111. 
22. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE TASK FoRCE ON 
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: IssUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30-31 (1986) [hereinafter 
"1986 Task Force Report"]. The report states: 
"Although there are recurring proposals to extend presumed consent from cor- -
neas to other tissues and vascularized organs, both consensus derived from experts 
in the field and public opinion polls show that there is little support for this mecha-
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An additional factor may have been that the presumed consent 
concept was being confused with an entirely different approach, 
that of "required request." In 1983, Arthur Caplan had called for a 
shift from encouraged voluntarism to a system in which hospitals 
would be required by law to ask potential donors or their families if 
they had any objection to the removal of organs following death. 23 
Since people would be asked if they objected to donation rather 
than if they consented, 24 Caplan felt that this amounted to creating 
a presumption in favor of removing organs. His proposal di1fered 
from Sanders' and Dukeminier's original presumed consent scheme 
in the key respect that, under Caplan's approach, organs could be 
harvested only if the donor or family expressly stated that they had 
no objection, while according to Sanders and Dukeminier, organs 
could be removed without any action by the donor or the family, so 
long as neither the donor nor the family had voiced an objection. 
Caplan's position thus in fact occupied a middle ground between 
encouraged voluntarism and presumed consent, as Matas and his 
colleagues pointed out in 1985.25 Nevertheless, Caplan termed his 
approach "presumed consent. "26 
Eventually, the distinction between asking donors and families if 
they consented to donation and asking them if they objected, which 
had formed the basis for Caplan calling his scheme "presumed con-
sent" in the first place, disappeared. All hospitals would simply be 
required to ask donors or their families for permission to remove 
organs. Caplan advocated this middle-ground approach as the solu-
nism as a way of increasing the availability of donor organs. It is clear that potential 
organ donors and their families want to continue to be the primary decisionmakers. 
Thus, the Task Force believes that present efforts should focus on enhancing the 
current voluntary system rather than on reducing the role of actual consent." 
23. See Caplan, supra note 12, at 27-28. 
24. /d. at 28 ("[f]amilies should be asked not whether they will consent to the donation 
of organs but whether they have any objections"). 
25. Matas 1985, supra note 14, at 231 ("(o)ur proposal charts a middle path between the 
current ineffective policy based on 'encouraged voluntarism' and 'presumed consent' policies 
that promise effectiveness at the cost of violating traditional ethical and legal principles"). 
Matas and his colleagues proposed that families be told the following prior to removal of 
organs: 
"As you probably know, it is official practice here, and everywhere else in our state, 
for suitable organs to be routinely removed from patients with brain death. Unless 
you and the rest of your family object, we will surgically remove one or more of 
your relative's vital organs in order that some other needy patient might live. In 
case you do object, we will certainly respect your wishes." 
Id. at 238. 
26. /d. 
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tion to the failure of encouraged voluntarism.27 Although he now 
used the more accurate term "required request," his original use of 
the term "presumed consent" may have led some who had favored 
Sanders' and Dukeminier's proposal to believe that the two ap-
proaches were substantially the same. 
In any event, required request became the preferred alternative 
in the mid-1980's. A number of state legislatures adopted it, begin-
ning with Oregon in 1985.28 In 1986, the Task Force on Organ 
Transplantation of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services endorsed it. 29 The UAGA was amended in 1987 to include 
a required request provision, 30 and eventually the federal govern-
ment added the establishment of required request policies to the list 
of conditions that hospitals have to fulfill in order to be eligible for 
reimbursement under MedicareY 
The historical background of the present debate over presumed 
consent would be incomplete without mention of a further key de-
velopment, and one that is not widely known. Although it is gener-
ally true that, in the mid-1980's, the principles of presumed consent 
were rejected in favor of required request, a number of states in fact 
enacted a presumed consent approach to organ removal. A recent 
survey, for example, shows that seventeen states permit coroners or 
medical examiners to remove corneas and/or pituitary glands with-
out obtaining the consent of either the donor or the next-of-kin. 32 
In these states, removal of organs is permissible so long as the coro-
ner or medical examiner is unaware of an objection. 33 In addition, 
Hawaii permits any tissues to be removed regardless of whether or 
not there is an objection, 34 and Vermont allows pituitaries to be 
removed unless an objection is made based on religious grounds. 35 
While the authority of the coroners and medical examiners in these 
27. Caplan, Organ Procurement: It's Not in the Cards, 14 HASTINGS CNTR. REP. 9 
(1984). 
28. See Burris, Marquette, Gordon, Iwata and Tanne, Impact of Routine Inquiry Legis-
lation in Oregon on Eye Donations, 6 CORNEA 226 (1987) [hereinafter "Burris"]. 
29. 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 22, at 31-34. 
30. UAGA(l987) § 5. 
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8. 
32. See Columbia Note, supra note 9, at 535, n.35-37 and accompanying text. The states 
are: Arkansas (pituitary); California (both); Colorado (pituitary); Connecticut (both); Dela-
ware (cornea); Florida (cornea); Georgia (cornea and eye); Kentucky (cornea); Maryland 
(cornea); Michigan (cornea); Missouri (pituitary); North Carolina (cornea); Ohio (cornea); 
Oklahoma (pituitary); Tennessee (cornea); Texas (cornea); and West Virginia (cornea). 
33. Id. at 535. 
34. See id. at 536, n.38. 
35. !d. 
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states is limited to removing organs from bodies in their custody, 
passage of these laws demonstrates that presumed consent currently 
is acceptable to some state legislatures under some circumstances. 36 
II. EXPERIENCE WITH REQUIRED REQUEST 
Required request was devised to deal with what were believed to 
be the underlying reasons for the failure of encouraged voluntarism. 
Opinion polls showed that few people voluntarily donated their own 
organs or those of members of their own families. Yet the polls also 
showed that an overwhelming majority approved of organ donation 
in principle, and hospitals found that, when asked, most families 
consented to removing the organs of dead relatives. 37 Asking fami-
lies rather than the donors themselves therefore seemed the best ap-
proach to increasing the supply of organs. The problem was that, 
under encouraged voluntarism, the families were not being asked. 38 
Physicians and nurses were reluctant to ask families to consent to 
donation while their loved ones were still alive, and, once death had 
occurred, caregivers did not like to interrupt families during their 
time of grief. 39 Physicians were also reported to be held back from 
discussing donation by the notion that the death of the patient was a 
medical failure. 40 The typical separation of treatment and trans-
plant teams within the hospital community also reduced structural 
incentives for establishing effective request proceduresY 
The solution represented by required request was to overcome 
this professional and institutional resistance by using the force of 
the law. Accordingly, state and federal laws were amended to re-
quire hospitals to request donation from the families of suitable 
donors. 
Although required request has been in operation for only a few 
years, there seems to be a growing sense that it has failed to solve 
the organ shortage problem. The data on whether or not required 
request has increased the rate of donation are mixed. Burris and his 
36. For a discussion of court decisions upholding these statutes, infra notes 125-29 and 
accompanying text. 
37. See Caplan, Requests, Gifts, and Obligations: The Ethics of Organ Procurement, 18 
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 49, 53 (Supp. 2 1986). 
38. See 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 22, at 43. 
39. See id. at 44. 
40. /d.; Youngner, Brain Death and Organ Procurement: Some Vexing Problems Re-
main, 19 DIALYSIS & TRANSPLANTATION 12, 14 (1990). 
41. The organ procurement agency, which is responsible for recovering, preserving and 
distributing organs for transplantation, depends on the referring physician to identify and 
refer potential organ donors. See Rivers, supra note I, at 80. 
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colleagues report that monthly collections of eyes in Oregon in-
creased 135 percent during the first year of routine request.42 The 
President of the Eye Bank Association of America claims that hos-
pital donations of eyes increased 66 percent following the switch to 
required request.43 The New York State Department of Health re-
ports that, in the year after the legislature passed a required request 
law in New York State, heart donations increased by 94 percent, 
livers by 96 percent, kidneys by 23 percent, and eyes by 58 per-
cent.44 Other data present a less favorable picture. Kittur and his 
colleagues in Baltimore attribute a phenomen~ 400 percent increase 
in donor referrals and a 500 percent increase in tissue donations to a 
vigorous "donor advocacy" program, but while their data show that 
more people were being asked to consent, the consent rate remained 
at only 39 percent of those asked, and the ratio of donations to re-
quests increased only 3 percent compared to the year immediately 
preceding the inception of the program.45 Andersen and Fox state 
that, while eye, bone and skin donations in Oregon increased, kid-
ney donations decreased the first year after required request was 
enacted. 46 They also report no increase in the number of organ do-
nors in Los Angeles and San Francisco following adoption of re-
quired request in California. 47 Caplan, who is perhaps most closely 
associated with the required request concept, admits that, while do-
nations have increased in many places, "these numbers ought to be 
even greater given the large number of persons who could donate 
tissue upon their deaths."48 Finally, even if required request laws 
have increased the availability of donor organs, it is clear that the 
42. Burris, supra note 28, at 226. 
43. Letter from Tom Moore, 19 HAsTINGS CNTR. REP. 44 (March/April 1989). 
44. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
REQUiRED REQUEST LAW: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR CUOMO AND THE LEGISLATURE IN-
CLUDING A STUDY OF TRANSPLANT SERVICES IN NEW YORK STATE (July 1987) cited in 
Andersen and Fox, The Impact of Routine Inquiry Laws on Organ Donation, HEALTH AF-
FAIRS 65, 75 (Winter 1988). 
45. See Kittur, McMenamin and Knott, Impact of an Organ Donor and Tissue Donor 
Advocacy Program on Community Hospitals, 56 AM. SURGEON 36, 38-39 (1990). 
46. Andersen and Fox, supra note 44, at 75. The authors state that kidney donations 
increased 12 percent during the second year after required request was imposed, but do not 
indicate what the increase was in reference to. 
47. Id. 
48. Caplan, Professional Arrogance and Public Misunderstanding, 18 HAsTINGS CNTR. 
REP. 34, 35 (April/May 1988). Caplan states that donation has increased from 10 to 20 
percent in many states, but that there has been no increase in others. However, he argues that 
the fact that donations have remained constant in those states despite significant declines in 
traffic fatalities suggests that required request has had "a small positive impact." I d. 
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number of organs still falls substantially short of the need.49 
Caplan cites two problems that procurement officials and state 
health department representatives believe to be responsible for the 
lack of success of required request laws. First, health professionals 
who must make the requests are not adequately trained to be effec-
tive, and second, physicians, regarding required request laws as a 
bureaucratic intrusion into the practice of medicine, refuse to com-
ply.50 The design of many state required request laws is also partly 
responsible: the laws often contain major loopholes allowing the 
requirements to be circumvented and in many cases no penalties are 
established for failure to comply.51 
It might not yet be time to write off required request. Better 
efforts to educate those who must deal with families of potential 
donors, perhaps coupled with more stringent legal requirements, 
might increase the frequency and effectiveness of donation re-
quests. 52 Greater monitoring of hospital compliance with Medicare 
required request requirements also could help.53 Nevertheless, dis-
appointment with required request has sparked renewed interest in 
other approaches, including presumed consent. 54 
III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF PRESUMED CONSENT 
A. Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation 
Interest in presumed consent stems chiefly from the expectation 
that it would significantly increase the supply of transplant organs. 
European experience with presumed consent is frequently cited in 
support. Benoit and his colleagues report that transplantation has 
49. See Rivers, supra note I and accompanying text. Andersen and Fox state that "[b]y 
itself, routine inquiry is not likely to affect significantly the supply of organs after early atten-
tion by the media." Andersen and Fox, supra note 44, at 77. Even enthusiastic supporters of 
required request admit that waiting lists of prospective donees persist. See, e.g. Burris, supra 
note 28, at 230. 
50. See Caplan, supra note 48, at 35. Caplan reports that, in many states, no more than 
50 percent of physicians comply with required request laws. I d. 
51. See Mehlman, Encouraging Donation of Organsfor Transplantation by Requiring 
Request, V Health Matrix 36-37 (1987). · 
52. More severe penalties might provoke a backlash from physicians, however. See 
Caplan, supra note 48, at 35 (physicians object to being told "what they must do," emphasis 
in original). 
53. The enforcement of Medicare conditions of participation, which include the re-
quired request requirements, has been criticized as generally inadequate, however. See INSTI-
TUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, I MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR 
QUALITY AssURANCE 132-34 (1990). 
54. Another approach that is receiving renewed attention is allowing transplant organs 
to be bought and sold. See, e.g. Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human 
Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 57 (1989). 
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increased since the introduction of presumed consent in France -
from 551 to 1808 kidneys; from 15 to 622 hearts and hearts/lungs; 
from 7 to 409 livers; and from 2 to 43 pancreas. 55 Roels and his 
colleagues state that the adoption of presumed consent in Belgium 
resulted in an 86 percent increase in cadaveric kidney procurement, 
and a 183 percent increase in the total number of organs available 
for transplant. 56 They also report much higher transplantation 
rates in three countries that they claim have presumed consent sys-
tems - Belgium, France and Austria - compared with three other 
countries that do not- the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and the Netherlands. 57 In a paper reporting more re-
cent data from 1989, Roels and his colleagues state flatly that "data 
presented show that, at least in Europe, the problem of chronic or-
gan shortage can adequately be solved in the setting of an [sic] opt-
ing-out legislation."58 
Unfortunately, the information from Europe can be deceiving. 
While France technically adopted a presumed consent approach in 
197 6, 59 French physicians routinely ask families for permission 
before removing organs. 60 Therefore, the experience in France re-
flects the operation of an encouraged voluntary or routine request 
system, rather than a true presumed consent approach. A similar 
practice prevails in Belgium; although physicians in Belgium are 
permitted legally to remove organs without permission, as a practi-
55. Benoit, Spira, Nicoulet and Moukarzel, Presumed Consent Law: Results of its Appli-
cation/Outcome from an Epidemiologic Survey, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 320 (April 
1990) [hereinafter "Benoit"]. 
56. Roels, Vanrenterghem, Waer, Gruwez and Michielsen, Effect of a Presumed Consent 
Law on Organ Retrieval in Belgium, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2078 (August 1990) [here-
inafter "Roels 1990"]. 
57. I d. at 2078-79. The authors conclude that "the relationship of organ availability and 
legislation within these countries shows clearly the beneficial effect of national legislations 
[sic] based on the principle of presumed consent." Id. at 2079. 
58. ROELS, V ANRENTERGHEM, W AER, CHRISTIAENS, GRUWEZ AND MICHIELSEN, 
THREE YEARS EXPERIENCE WITH A [SIC] "PRESUMED CONSENT" LEGISLATION IN 
BELGIUM: ITS IMPACT ON MULTI-ORGAN DONATION IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER EURo-
PEAN CoUNTRIES 4 (undated, supplied to author by the National Kidney Foundation) [here-
inafter "Roels Update"]. 
59. Loi No. 76-1181 du 22 decembre 1976, 1976 J.O. 7365, 1977 Dalloz-Sirey, Legisla-
tion [D.S.L.]I3. The law was called the Caillavet Law after its sponsor. French Note, supra 
note 16, at 1022. 
60. Communication from Pierre Korman, Director, French Transplant Association 
(Nov. 12, 1990). See also French Note, supra note 16, at 1025 (" ... some French doctors 
simply disregard the Law and seek the permission of the family in every case possible, thereby 
continuing the 'long-established custom' which was to have been eliminated by the 1976 
law"). Benoit reports that French physicians ask families for permission in 82.2 percent of 
cases. Benoit, supra note 55, at 321. 
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cal matter they inform families of the option to refuse and ask if the 
families have any objections. 61 
One true presumed consent system in Europe is found in Aus-
tria. 62 A patient who does not wish to donate organs mu8t state his 
objection in writing. Donation is not discussed with families unless 
they raise the issue. The only exceptions are cases involving pediat-
ric patients and foreigners. 63 
It is therefore noteworthy that the latest data from Eurotrans-
plant on the availability of kidneys for transplantation show that 
Austria not only has a significantly higher rate than the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, all of 
which have voluntary donation systems, but also a rate more than 
11 percent higher than Belgium, which, despite its de jure presumed 
consent system, operates de facto on the basis of encouraged volun-
tarism or routine request. 64 The Austrian data on heart and liver 
donation are not as clear. If presumed consent provided more or-
gans than other donation approaches, it would be expected that, as 
a percentage of the population, more hearts and livers would be 
61. Personal communication from Bernadette Haase, General Manager, Eurotransplant 
(Dec. 17, 1990). Roels and his colleagues seem to realize the weak foundation for their claim 
that the experience in Belgium demonstrates the efficacy of presumed consent when they 
admit that, according to their data, the major reason for the increase in organ donation in 
countries like Belgium was "the participation of an increasing number of smaller non-univer-
sity hospitals in organ procurement." Roels Update, supra note 58, at 4. 
There is confusion among other scholars regarding whether various countries have en-
couraged voluntary, routine request, or presumed consent systems. For example, Silver states 
that presumed consent systems operate in Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden, 
whereas Matas and Vieth state that the laws in these countries require physicians to ask 
families if they object to donation. Compare Silver, supra note 7, at 703, with Matas & Vieth, 
supra note 16, at 156. If Matas and Vieth are correct, this undercuts Silver's claim that 
European countries with presumed consent systems still lack sufficient organs for transplan-
tation. See Silver, supra, at 706. But Matas and Vieth themselves describe the French system 
as one of presumed consent. See, Matas and Vieth, supra. 
62. Personal communication from Bernadette Haase, General Manager, Eurotransplant 
(Dec. 17, 1990) and Herman Fetz, Transplant Coordinator, University Hospitals of Inns-
brock, Austria (Dec. 18, 1990). It is not clear that presumed consent actually operates in any 
other European countries. 
63. Personal communication with Herman Fetz, supra note 62. 
64. See EUROTRANSPLANT FOUNDATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1989, Table 1.7 (1989). 
The number of kidneys available per million inhabitants in 1989 was 52.1 in Austria; 40.9 in 
Belgium; 30.3 in Germany; 20.0 in Luxemburg; and 24.9 in The Netherlands. In 1988, the 
rates were 39.3 (Austria); 38.0 (Belgium); 26.9 (Germany); 26.7 (Luxemburg); and 25.5 (The 
Netherlands). ld. Eurotransplant does not provide data on France, and therefore its data do 
not permit the kidney donation experience in Austria to be compared with the experience in 
France. A table in a paper by Roels and colleagues shows that Belgium and France in 1988 
transplanted more kidneys per million inhabitants than Austria, but the question is not how 
many kidneys were transplanted, but how many were available through donation. See Roels 
1990, supra note 56, at 2079, Fig. 2. 
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donated in Austria not only in comparison with countries that have 
de jure and de facto voluntary systems, like the United Kingdom, 
Germany and The Netherlands, but also in comparison with 
Belgium and France. According to Roels and his colleagues, Aus-
tria, Belguim and France all have much higher numbers of hearts 
and livers available for transplantation per million inhabitants than 
the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and The 
Netherlands.65 But while Austria has a somewhat higher rate for 
livers than either France or Belgium, it has a lower rate for hearts. 66 
The Austrian experience therefore provides some support for the 
notion that adopting presumed consent increases the supply of do-
nor organs over other donation approaches, but the data are incom-
plete, and a number of questions remain unanswered. 
A significant question arises, however, regarding the relevance 
of the Austrian experience to the United States. Unlike the U.S. 
and other European countries, Austria has long permitted autopsies 
to be performed without consent, and this practice has been in-
grained in physicians through their training.67 Austrian physicians 
therefore are likely to be more willing to remove organs for trans-
plantation without express consent than their American or Euro-
pean colleagues. Since Austria is the only European country with a 
history of autopsy without consent, this also would explain why 
physicians in Austria refrain from seeking permission from families 
when that practice has overwhelmed the de jure presumed consent 
systems in countries such as France and Belgium. 
B. More Humane for Families 
While the prospect of increasing the supply of organs for dona-
tion is the major benefit anticipated from a shift to presumed con-
sent, there may be other important benefits as well. To begin with, 
since presumed consent would eliminate the need to confront be-
reaved relatives with requests for donation, it may be more humane 
than required request. "To someone whose relative is about to die," 
wrote Dukeminier and Sanders, "asking for the kidneys may seem a 
ghoulish request."68 The same may be true for relatives whose 
loved one has just been declared legally dead. 69 
65. See Roels Update, supra note 58, fig. 2. 
66. Id. 
67. Personal communication with Bernard Cohen, Director, Eurotransplant (Feb. 25, 
1991). 
68. Dukeminier and Sanders, supra note 7, at 416. 
69. The distastefulness of approaching families may be compounded when the body is 
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C. Increased Patient Autonomy and Informed Consent 
Presumed consent may increase the likelihood that decisions 
about donation are voluntary and informed. Since the decision to 
object to donation would be made voluntarily by the patient or the 
family (depending on how the presumed consent system were 
designed), the decision could be made at a time when the deci-
sionmakers were not confronting their own or their loved one's 
death. It therefore might be more deliberative and dispassionate 
than a decision under required request. 70 
Presumed consent also may enhance patient autonomy. Under 
required request, the ultimate decision to donate typically is made 
by the patient's family, rather than by the patient. Even in the in-
frequent case in which the patient had signed a donor card or other-
wise expressed a desire to donate, surgeons are unlikely to remove 
organs unless the family has given permission.71 When the family 
disagrees with the patient's disposition, required request therefore 
may frustrate the patient's actual wishes. 
Depending on how it was implemented, presumed consent 
might reduce the ability of the family to override the decedent. 72 
The family might be given no right to object when the patient, as-
being maintained on life support systems to preserve the viability of the transplant organs. 
See Youngner, supra note 40, at 14; Martyn, Wright and Clark, Required Request/or Organ 
Donation: Moral, Clinical, and Legal Problems, 18 HASTINGS CNTR. REP. 27, 29 (April/May 
1988) [hereinafter "Martyn"] ("[t]he family also is faced with a significant psychological bur-
den as they are confronted with their loss and attempt to comprehend a diagnosis of death 
belied by their observation of an apparently breathing, pulsating, and warm body"). 
70. See Matas 1985, supra note 14, at 240 ("[i)n the charged atmosphere of sudden 
death of a family member, it is doubtful that genuinely informed and autonomous consent is 
often given for organ removal"); Caplan, supra note 12, at 26 (same). Some commentators 
have gone further and charged that required request actually may coerce the family into 
donation. See Martyn, supra note 69, at 29 ("[t]he request for donation may thus set the stage 
for undue influence on or psychological manipulation of the family"). 
71. Misunderstandings about the legal status of this widespread practice is reflected by 
the fact that Gallup polls have repeatedly asked respondents if they are aware that "even with 
a signed donor card, family consent must be obtained before organs can be removed for 
transplantation." See THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., GALLUP SURVEY: THE U.S. 
PUBLIC'S AITITUDE TOWARD ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION/ORGAN DONATION (1985, 
1986, 1987, 1990) (commissioned by the Dow Chemical Company's Take Initiative Program 
on Transplantation) [hereinafter referred to by the term "Gallup Poll" and the year of the 
survey]. This question may give the impression that the law requires families to give permis-
sion even when there is a signed donor card, and that in the absence of permission from the 
family, the donor's wishes can be ignored. Under the 1987 UAGA, however, it is illegal to 
ignore the wishes of the decedent in favor of those of the family. See UAGA(l987) § 2(h). 
72. See French Note, supra note 16, at 1020 ("[i)n practice donor cards are generally 
ignored, leaving the decision entirely in the hands of the family ... [;] a policy ofpresumed 
consent, rather than quashing individual rights, would make the donor the primary, and 
perhaps exclusive, decision-maker in organ donation"). 
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suming he or she was competent, had not refused donation. More 
likely, the role of the family might be limited, at least nominally, to 
expressing what they believed to be the patient's desires rather than 
their own. 73 
D. Effectuating Public Preferences 
Although it is commonly believed that the public is opposed to 
presumed consent, some commentators argue that most people in 
fact are favorable or indifferent and simply cannot admit it or act 
upon it. 74 In support, these commentators cite the fact that far 
more people state that they are willing to donate their organs than 
fill out donor cards. This suggests that people are in favor of dona-
tion in the abstract, but that psychological factors involved in con-
templating their own deaths, or those of their loved ones, make 
them unable to articulate their true wishes. 75 By eliminating the 
need to confront donation actively in order to donate, presumed 
consent might overcome these psychological impediments and al-
low individuals to give effect to their true beliefs. 
Before leaving the subject of why presumed consent might be 
beneficial, it is worth pointing out that, while it is important to at-
tempt to create a donation system that is more humane, in which 
decision-making is more autonomous and informed, and that is 
more consistent with underlying personal beliefs, the chief purpose 
of presumed consent is to increase the supply of donor organs. 
Therefore, even if presumed consent did not provide any of these 
secondary benefits, it still might be preferred to existing approaches 
so long as it yielded a significantly greater number of transplant 
organs. 
IV. OBJECTIONS TO PRESUMED CONSENT 
Opponents of presumed consent raise ethical, religious, legal 
73. This is the rule in France, whereby law the family is only supposed to assert the 
patient's own objections. See Ministere de Ia Sante et de Ia Securite Sociale, Circulaire du 3 
avril 1978 concernat le Decret No. 78-501 du 31 mars 1978, 1978 J.O. 1530, 1978 Bulletin 
Legislatif Dalloz [B.L.D.] 249, sec. II (B). As a practical matter, however, the family often 
will express, or be asked to express, its own preferences. See Benoit, supra note 55, at 321 
(study showed French families asked for their own wishes 51.4 percent of the time). 
74. See Silver, supra note 7, at 697; Matas 1985, supra note 14, at 236. 
75. See Silver, supra note 7, at 697 ("[t]hat seventy-five percent of the populace should 
say 'yea' to organ donation from an armchair, while eighty-three percent say 'nay' from the 
deathbed, suggests that most people believe they should donate their organs but cannot bring 
themselves to do so"); Matas 1985, supra note 14, at 236 (pointing out that people find organ 
donation "too troubling or frightening to think about," or "cannot really comprehend their 
own death or do not wish to think about it"). 
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and practical objections. In the first place, they doubt that pre-
sumed consent would increase the supply of donor organs. 76 Citing 
the experience in France, critics assert that health professionals in 
the United States would behave no differently than their French 
counterparts, and would refuse to harvest organs without express 
permission. 77 This is an empirical question, and underscores the 
need for definitive data from Austria and other countries demon-
strating the impact of presumed consent on organ availability. 
Critics of presumed consent do not rest on this point, however. 
They take the position that, contrary to those who argue that pre-
sumed consent would yield the secondary benefits described above, 
such a system would be so inhumane, manipulative and unpopular 
that it must be rejected for those reasons alone. In other words, the 
end does not justify the means. The question then is, assuming that 
presumed consent would significantly increase the supply of donor 
organs, must it be rejected for other reasons? 
A. Ethical Objections. 
The ethical objections to presumed consent can best be summa-
rized by referring to the five ethical values that the Task Force on 
Organ Transplantation of the Department of Health and Human 
Services in 1986 identified as necessary for any organ procurement 
system to promote: 
1) "saving lives and improving quality of life"; 
2) "promoting a sense of community through acts of 
generosity"; 
3) "respecting individual autonomy"; 
4) "showing respect for the decedent"; and 
5) "showing respect for the wishes of the family."78 
There would seem to be little disagreement that, assuming that 
presumed consent significantly increased the supply of cadaveric or-
gans, it would promote the first value of saving lives and improving 
76. See, e.g., French Note, supra note 16, at 1029. Youngner argues, for example, that 
"the notion that we can quickly resolve our society's ambivalence with laws and regulations is 
misguided," and states that such an approach will create a "rebound" effect that will reduce 
rather than increase donations. Youngner, Organ RetrievaL· Can We Ignore the Dark Side?, 
22 TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 1014, 1015 (1990). See also Youngner, supra note 40, at 14 
(attempting to bypass resistance to donation through laws and regulations "will, in the long 
run, prove no more productive than pointing accusatory fingers"). 
77. See French Note, supra note 16, at 1029 (" ... if the French experience is to serve as 
a guide, such a change would have little, if any, effect on the supply of organs for 
transplant"). 
78. 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 22, at 28. 
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the quality of life. Several studies have demonstrated, for example, 
that kidney transplants provide a better quality of life for end stage 
renal disease patients than dialysis, and that transplantation is more 
economical. 79 
Ethical objections to presumed consent therefore must be based 
on its inability to meet one or more of the other four objectives. 
The second objective is a restatement of Ramsey's defense of volun-
tary behavior, which was mentioned earlier: the more the state 
takes away the opportunity to act voluntarily, the less of an oppor-
tunity individuals have to be altruistic, and therefore the less virtu-
ous our community will be. 80 Since presumed consent laws 
eliminate the need to express our willingness to donate organs, they 
arguably reduce our ability to act generously. 
One response to this objection is that presumed consent laws 
facilitate rather than reduce altruistic behavior. This follows from 
the argument, described earlier, that people really want to donate 
their organs, or those of their loved ones, but for psychological rea-
sons cannot bring themselves to do so.81 According to this argu-
ment, presumed consent allows people to fulfill their altruistic 
impulses by refraining from objecting, which is psychologically eas-
ier for them than having to give their express consent. While altru-
istic action ideally might be preferred to altruistic inaction, 
altruistic behavior, even of an inactive sort, is better than nonal-
truistic behavior. 
In addition, Ramsey's position seems to lead to an absurd result. 
Imagine telling a patient waiting for a life-saving transplant that he 
will be allowed to die just in case someone decides at the last minute 
to be benevolent and to donate the needed organ. Given the fact 
that people have not been willing to donate enough organs under 
encouraged voluntarism and required request, it is hard to accept 
the idea that we should avoid saving lives and improving quality of 
79. See Simmons and Abress, Quality-of-Life Issues for End-Stage Renal Disease Pa-
tients, 15 AM. J. Of KIDNEY DISEASES 201 (1990) (successful transplant patients have a 
higher quality oflife than dialysis patients); Bremer, McCauley, Wrona and Johnson, Quality 
of Life in End-State Renal Disease: A Reexamination, 13 AM. J. Of KIDNEY DISEASES 200 
(1989) (transplant patients quality of life higher than dialysis patients); Eggers, Effect of 
Transplantation on the Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease Program, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 
223, 228 (1988) (dialysis costs approximately three times as much as successful transplanta-
tion); Morris and Jones, Transplantation Versus Dialysis: A Study of Quality of Life, 20 
TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 23 (1988) (transplant patients report better quality of life than 
dialysis patients). 
80. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
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life on the off-chance that people's behavior suddenly will change. 82 
The potential failure of presumed consent to promote the re-
maining three values in these task force's list is a more telling objec-
tion. By allowing organs to be removed without permission, it 
might be said, presumed consent would conflict with individual au-
tonomy and would be highly disrespectful of the decedent and of 
the wishes of the family. Imagine the horror of the family upon 
learning that, not only was their loved one dead, but that his organs 
had been removed without consent. The suffering that this would 
inflict on the family, the disempowering of the patient that would 
result from denying him an opportunity to control the disposition of 
his own body, and the distrust of health care providers that this 
would breed are so significant that they could outweigh any benefit 
that transplantation might provide. Indeed, they could undermine 
the organ donation system as a whole. 
As suggested earlier, the objection that presumed consent would 
interfere with patient autonomy may be misplaced if presumed con-
sent is being compared with required request, since required request 
as a practical matter allows the family to override the patient's 
wishes with regard to donation.83 Nevertheless, there is such an 
inescapable, underlying unease created by the prospect that health 
care providers will be permitted to perform acts on dead bodies re-
gardless of the wishes of the patient and the family that a presumed 
consent system must address these concerns in order to be a viable 
policy option. 
One alternative would be to adopt a presumed consent system 
but to conceal it from public knowledge. After all, if patients and 
their families were unaware that organs were being removed, they 
would have no occasion to be upset. Assuming families retained the 
option of viewing the dead relative at the funeral, this would not 
only entail harvesting organs in such a way that the absence of the 
organs would not be noticeable, which would be desirable anyway 
to spare the family, but refraining from conducting any public infor-
mation programs about the donation system. 
82. Ramsey's position is reminiscent of Cahn's approach to the classic lifeboat dilemma 
in which he argues that no one should be thrown overboard even though this means everyone 
will drown. See E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF 
AMERICAN LAW 71 (1955). As Cahn makes clear, however, he does not actually intend for 
everyone to die; instead, he hopes that some altruistic occupant will sacrifice himself to save 
the others. I d. Even if this were to occur, it would have the paradoxical result that the person 
who most deserved to live inevitably would die - either by committing suicide or by being 
drowned with the others. 
83. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
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This approach would be both unethical and impractical. By at-
tempting to hide the truth, it would deprive patients and their fami-
lies of a meaningful opportunity to object to donation. The result 
would not be a system of presumed consent, but of mandatory or-
gan removal. 84 Physicians are unlikely to accept such an approach. 
Nor could such a system be kept secret for long. For one thing, the 
press would be sure to find out and to seize upon it. 85 The resulting 
public backlash would almost certainly lead to legal action against 
providers and force the repeal of any presumed consent legislation 
that had been passed. 
A better approach would be to educate patients and their fami-
lies about how presumed consent worked and to construct an effec-
tive opting-out method by which they can express their objections 
to donation. In this way, a presumed consent system can be consis-
tent with the ethical objectives of achieving individual autonomy 
and respecting the decedent and the wishes of the family, at the 
same time that it increased the supply of transplant organs by 
avoiding the need for express consent. 
Constructing an effective educational program and opting-out 
system would not be easy. Experience with encouraged voluntarism 
and required request shows that educating the public and providers 
about organ donation is expensive and difficult. Furthermore, little 
attention has been given to how to design an opting-out system for 
the United States. The experience of European countries with pre-
sumed consent legislation is of little value. In Austria, a patient's 
objections must be made by written document, and there does not 
appear to be any method by which a family's objections can be as-
serted. 86 France allows objections to be recorded by individual hos-
pitals, but makes no provision for coordinating this information so 
that the objection will be honored if the patient is treated at another 
institution. 87 Belgium employs a computerized central registry 
where objections may be recorded and which may be accessed by 
transplant centers.88 However, there is considerable opposition in 
84. For a defense of such a system, see Silver, supra note 7. One of Silver's arguments in 
favor of his "organ draft" proposal is that people would not be sufficiently aware that a 
presumed consent system was in operation to object to donation, and that presumed consent 
therefore would represent mandatory harvesting in disguise. !d. at 706. 
85. One is reminded of Alexander's expose of the operation of the Seattle Artificial Kid-
ney Center during the dialysis crisis of the 1960s. See Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, 
Who Dies, 53 LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at 102-04. 
86. Personal communication with Herman Fetz, supra note 62. 
87. See Benoit, supra note 55, at 320. 
88. See Roels 1990, supra note 56, at 2078. 
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the United States to the use of centralized computer registries. 89 In 
any event, the practice of physicians in France and Belgium of re-
questing permission to remove organs suggests that neither country 
has established an opting-out system that is satisfactory.90 
Furthermore, the opting-out system would have to address a 
number of thorny issues. What should the role of the family be in 
relation to the patient? Should objections by the family be able to 
override a patient's wishes to donate? Under the current system, the 
decedent's instructions are controlling, so long as the decedent com-
plies with the requirements of the UAGA. 91 Effectuating the dece-
dent's wishes under a presumed consent system would be more 
difficult, however. If the decedent wanted to donate his organs, he 
merely could refrain from registering an objection under whatever 
opting-out system was adopted. However, the same lack of objec-
tion would occur in the case of a decedent who did not want to 
donate but who was unaware of the need to object. In either case, 
there would be no binding instructions left by the decedent, and 
therefore no way to determine if an objection from family members 
was consistent with or contradicted the decedent's wishes.92 
A presumed consent system also would need special rules to 
govern removal of organs from minors, from patients who had 
never been competent, and from patients who died without family 
members being available. Under the UAGA, for example, a minor 
cannot make a binding disposition of his organs; only the family can 
grant permission for organs to be removed.93 A similar approach 
might be taken under presumed consent, in which case organs could 
be removed unless the family objected. Alternatively, the minor's 
inability to make binding decisions may justify an exception to the 
89. See, e.g., 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 22, at 49-51 (rejecting national registry 
for recording willingness to donate voluntarily). 
90. One commentator asserts, for example, that physicians in France are concerned that 
people are not sufficiently informed about the law to make known their objections, and feel 
that having to check hospital records for objections is more burdensome than merely asking 
families. See French Note, supra note 16, at 1025-26. 
91. See UAGA(1987), § 2(h) ("[a]n anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor 
before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent or concurrence of any person 
after the donor's death"); § 3(a) (family may donate organs "unless the decedent, at the time 
of death, has made an unrevoked refusal to make that anatomical gift"); UAGA(l968) § 2(b) 
(family may donate "in the absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent"). 
92. The opting-out system also would have to establish a priority list of relatives to sort 
out disagreements within the family. Such a priority list is incorporated in the UAGA. See 
UAGA(l987) § 3(a); UAGA(l968) § 2(b). A similar priority list is proposed for presumed 
consent systems in Note, The Constitutionality of 'Presumed Consent' for Organ Donation, 9 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 343, 357 (1989) [hereinafter "Hamline Note"]. 
93. See UAGA(l987) §§ 2(a), 3(a); UAGA(l968) §§ 2(a), 2(b). 
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usual rule of presumed consent and necessitate adopting a require-
ment that the family give express permission to donation. Finally, 
the opting-out system would need an effective means by which a 
decedent who had objected to donation could change his mind. 94 
While it would be difficult to design an acceptable opting-out 
system, the problems might not be insurmountable. With adequate 
research, it is possible that an opting-out system could be con-
structed that, on the one hand, was not so burdensome for dece-
dents, families or health providers that it unduly discouraged organ 
retrieval, and on the other hand, satisfied ethical concerns by giving 
adequate consideration to the participants' wishes and sensibilities. 
B. Religious Objections 
In addition to the objection that presumed consent would not be 
sufficiently sensitive to the feelings of decedents and their next-of-
kin in general, some of its opponents are particularly concerned that 
it would conflict with religious views against donation and trans-
plantation. 95 This could make enactment of presumed consent laws 
extremely difficult politically, and could lead courts to declare them 
unconstitutional on first amendment grounds. 96 
There is considerable confusion over the extent of valid religious 
objections to donation and transplantation. Despite its rejection of 
presumed consent, for example, the HHS Task Force on Organ 
Transplantation in 1986 asserted that "no major religious group in 
the United States opposes organ donation as a matter of formal 
doctrine."97 
One source of religious opposition, however, is believed to be 
orthodox Judaism. An Israeli rabbi, Mordechai Halperin, was 
quoted in 1985 as saying that "Jewish law would treat as 'murder' 
the removal of organs from a body whose heart was beating but 
whose EEG record was fiat," voicing a traditional Jewish objection 
94. The UAGA sets forth a number of methods by which an anatomical gift may be 
revoked, including by a communication from a terminally ill patient addressed to a physician 
or surgeon. See UAGA(l987) § 2(f)(3); UAGA(1968) § 6(a)(3). More elaborate methods for 
revoking an objection to donation might be needed under a presumed consent system to 
ensure that the wishes of decedents and their families were being respected. 
95. See, e.g., Matas 1985, supra note 14, at 238 ("[g]roups professing disapproval of 
organ donation on explicitly religious grounds could argue convincingly that a 'presumed 
consent' policy would make it especially difficult for their members to practice their chosen 
faith ... "). 
96. See id. For a discussion of first amendment issues, see infra notes 142-43 and ac-
companying text. 
97. 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 22, at 38. 
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to accepting brain death as a definition of death. 98 On the other 
hand, a leading orthodox Jewish ethicist, Fred Rosner, explains that 
opinion is shifting on the brain death issue and that "[ w ]hether or 
not total, irreversible brain stem death, as evidenced by sophisti-
cated medical testing, is the Jewish legal equivalent of decapitation 
[and therefore qualifies as a criterion of death] is presently a matter 
of intense debate in rabbinic circles. " 99 
Aside from the issue of the determination of death, which re-
lates to the availability of suitable cadaveric organs, 100 Jewish doc-
trine is unclear on the issue of donation itself. Halperin, for 
example, believes that "[t]he removal of livers for transplantation 
would be permissible because artificial organs are not available, but 
kidney transplants are not always justifiable because kidney dialysis 
is possible."101 Rosner states however that "[a]ll rabbinic authori-
ties would agree that such a case [kidney transplantation] consti-
tutes piku'ach nefesh, or danger to life, and, therefore, the 
prohibitions revolving around the dead donor would all be set aside 
for the overriding consideration of saving a life."102 Rosner notes 
that there is less consensus when life is not at stake, such as when 
the issue is corneal transplants, but concludes that "corneal, renal 
and cardiac transplantation are sanctioned by most rabbis and even 
mandated by some . . . . " 103 
Persons of Asian descent are also thought to object to donation 
and transplantation for religious reasons. 104 In Japan, an attempted 
heart transplant in 1968 and a simultaneous kidney !liver transplant 
in 1984, using organs obtained from brain dead patients, triggered 
criticism and, in the former incident, prompted an investigation by 
the prosecutor. 105 Moreover, Japanese lawmakers continue to resist 
establishing any legal definition of death, much less a brain death 
criterion. However, legislation in 1979 allows kidneys and corneas 
to be removed upon the donor's written request or with the permis-
sion of the family, and one commentator observes that, "in the fu-
98. Meyers, Medicine Confronts Jewish Law, 318 NATURE 97 (1985) [hereinafter 
"Nature"]. 
99. F. ROSNER, MODERN MEDICINE AND JEWISH ETHICS 251 (1986). 
100. Maintaining respiration and circulation in brain dead individuals by artificial means 
greatly increases the usefulness of their organs for transplantation. 
101. Nature, supra note 98, at 97. 
102. Rosner, supra note 99, at 270. 
103. /d. 
104. Personal communication from Stephen Post, Ph.D., Center for Biomedical Ethics, 
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine (Dec. 18, 1990). 
105. Feldman, Defining Death: Organ Transplants, Tradition and Technology in Japan, 
27 Soc. SCI. MED. 339, 341 (1988). No formal charges were made. 
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ture Japan will become as active in organ transplantation as most 
nations in the West." 106 
Religious concerns are believed to be in part responsible for the 
lower donation and transplant rates for African-Americans. 107 A 
recent Gallup poll found that, while 29 percent of white respon-
dents stated that they are very likely to want to donate their organs 
and 80 percent stated that they would give permission for the or-
gans of a loved one to be donated, the figures for African-Ameri-
cans dropped to 17 and 71 percent respectively. 108 Yet the effect of 
religious opposition in this population may be small in comparison 
with other factors, such as lack of information, financial constraints 
and distrust of the white medical establishment. 109 
In summary, although the extent of religious opposition may be 
uncertain, and although some religious groups may be moving to-
ward a more favorable attitude toward donation and transplanta-
tion generally, religious concerns cannot be ignored in designing a 
presumed consent program. For one thing, both the orthodox Jew-
ish and Japanese Shinto religions seem to be dead set against any 
approach that would deny the family the right to object to dona-
tion. 110 Educational efforts that accompanied the adoption of pre-
sumed consent therefore would have to pay particular attention to 
religious groups with known objections, and the methods for opt-
ing-out would have to be highly effective and "user-friendly." It 
might even be necessary for the opting-out system to include special 
mechanisms for ensuring that religious objections were identified 
and respected. 111 Given an adequate opting-out system, however, 
106. Id. at 341-42. 
107. Engel, Project's Goal Is To Increase Blacks' Contribution of Organs, Wash. Post, July 
26, 1984, at Cl ("[r]eligious fears, lack of information and distrust of a mostly white medical 
community are all factors in the low rates of donors who are black"). 
108. See Gallup Poll 1990, supra note 71, at 3. 
109. Cf Engel, supra note 107. The Gallup survey did not investigate the relative impact 
of these factors. 
110. See Rosner, supra note 99, at 261, 265 (removal of organs without consent would be 
theft, according to Jewish doctrine); Feldman, supra note 105, at 342 (Shinto beliefs "reflect a 
commitment to the idea that the family should have the ultimate say in what happens to the 
corpse after death"). 
Iii. One alternative would be to reverse the presumption in favor of donation when the 
decedent was known to be a member of a religious group that was opposed to donation, and 
instead to require express consent by the donor or the family in order for organs to be re-
moved. This would increase the administrative burdens and liability risks on health provid-
ers, however. Another issue is whether public policy towards religious objections to donation 
should be reciprocal in terms of access to transplantation - that is, whether members of 
religious groups that oppose donating organs for religious reasons ought to be disqualified 
from receiving donor organs. 
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religious concerns need not preclude the adoption of presumed 
consent. 
C. Legal Objections 
Legal concerns raised by presumed consent fall into two general 
categories - constitutional issues, and criminal and civil liability. 
Neither area presents any serious impediments to adopting a pre-
sumed consent approach. 
1. Constitutional Concerns 
Constitutional issues arise because of the need for government 
involvement in implementing and operating a presumed consent 
system. Since presumed consent would alter the existing legal rules 
regarding organ donation, it would have to be adopted by state leg-
islative action. In particular, states would have to replace or amend 
the VA GA. 112 In addition, the opting-out system might be super-
vised or sanctioned by the government. 
The presence of governmental or "state" action means that pre-
sumed consent would have to meet constitutional requirements. 113 
Two major constitutional principles are involved - the first amend-
ment prohibition against government interference with the free ex-
ercise of religion, 114 and the fifth amendment, which prohibits the 
government from depriving persons of liberty or property without 
due process, or taking private property for public use without just 
compensation. 115 
It is extremely unlikely that a court would declare a presumed 
consent law with an effective opting-out system unconstitutional on 
the basis that it deprived persons of substantive property rights in 
violation of the fifth amendment. Most courts have not regarded 
112. Federal legislation may require hospitals and other health care providers to establish 
presumed consent procedures in order to qualify for Medicare and Medicaid, although this 
could create a s_erious conflict for providers in states whose legislatures have not y_et amended 
the UAGA. . 
113. This paper addresses these issues from the perspective of the U.S. Constitution. 
There is no reason to believe that a presumed consent program that complied with federal 
constitutional mandates would encounter any problems from the provisions of state constitu-
tions, but this question may require further research when a presumed consent system has 
been more fully outlined. 
114. The first amendment states, inter alia, that "Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. 
Amend. I, cl. I. 
115. See U.S. CoNST. amend. V. The provisions of the fifth amendment are applicable to 
actions under state (as opposed to federal) law under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
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donor organs as property within the terms of the amendment. His-
torically, English law conferred jurisdiction over the disposition of 
corpses on ecclesiastical courts rather than on the secular authori-
ties and their common law courts. 116 As a consequence, English 
common law, which was the source of the legal principles governing 
property rights in the United States, never included dead bodies or 
their constituent parts within its rules. American courts followed 
suit, holding that neither the decedent nor the next of kin have a 
property right in the body in the usual sense. 117 Instead, family 
members at most have a right to dispose of the deceased's remains, 
consistent with laws and government regulations on the subject. 118 
While this right is often referred to as a "quasi-property" right, 119 
most courts have held that it does not confer upon the family the 
type of property rights that are protected by fifth amendment. 120 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held 
that families had a "substantial interest in the dead body" that was 
protected by due process. 121 
Even if organs were accorded the status of constitutionally pro-
tected property, a presumed consent system would not necessarily 
constitute a "taking" under the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment. Assuming that the body were returned to the family in 
a condition suitable for burial following removal of organs for trans-
116. See Columbia Note, supra note 9, at 550, n.l06; Naylor, supra note 6, at 170; Silver, 
supra note 7, at 689, n.29; Dukeminier and Sanders, supra note 7, at 414. 
117. See, e.g, State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986); Gray v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 246, 68 P.2d lOll, 1015 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937); Williams v. Wil-
liams, 20 Ch. D. 659, 665 (1881). 
118. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 94 N.M. 491, 494, 612 P.2d 1302, 1305 (1980); Spiegel v. 
Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90, 93, 186 A. 585, 586 (1936); Yome v. Gorman, 242 
N.Y. 395, 152 N.E. 126 (1926); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904); Pierce 
v. Properties of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872). 
119. But see Naylor, supra note 6, at 175 ("the family's right to the corpse is now explic-
itly based on protection from mental distress rather than quasi-property rights"), citing 
Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hasp., 109 N.J. 523, 531, 538 A.2d 346, 350 (1988). 
Naylor also quotes the statement in Prosser and Keeton that the family's quasi-property right 
"is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and . . . in reality the personal 
feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a 
lawyer." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS§ 12, at 63 (5th ed. 1984). 
120. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986) (no constitutionally recog-
nized property right in dead bodies); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 
335 S.E.2d 127 (1985) (same). See also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 51 Cal. 3d 
120, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479 (1990) (patient has no property right in cells removed 
from him for research and commercial purposes). 
121. Brotherton v. Cleveland, No. 89-3820 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 1991) (available on Lexis, 
1991 U.S. App. Lexis 779) [hereinafter "Brotherton"] (family has "legitimate claim of entitle-
ment" protected by due process). Id at 5. 
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plantation, the family would not be deprived of its right to dispose 
of the body or of any of its value. 122 Furthermore, the opting-out 
system would allow the family to prevent removal of organs (as-
suming no contrary indication by the decedent), so that the family's 
failure to exercise its opting-out rights could be deemed to be acqui-
escence, rather than a taking without permission. In any event, in 
view of the legal prohibition against the sale of organs, 123 it is hard 
to imagine how donors or their families could receive "just compen-
sation" under the takings clause of the fifth amendment. 124 
The constitutionality of a presumed consent law under the prop-
erty clauses of the fifth amendment is supported by recent state 
court decisions upholding the constitutionality of state statutes au-
thorizing nonconsensual removal of corneal tissue. In State v. Pow-
ell, 125 the Florida Supreme Court, by a vote of six to one, held that 
the removal of corneal tissue for transplantation during statutorily 
required autopsies was not a constitutionally protected taking of 
private property. 126 It is noteworthy that the Florida law does not 
establish an explicit opting-out system; the coroner is permitted to 
remove corneal tissue so long as he does not know of an objection 
by the next of kin. 127 The Georgia Supreme Court reached. the 
same result in a case involving a similar statute. 128 
In a recent federal case, however, Brotherton v. Cleveland, the 
122. See Hamline Note, supra note 92, at 369 ("[t]he value of a dead body to the next of 
kin [assuming that the next of kin does not want the cadaver organs for their own transplant] 
is not appreciably diminished when one or several organs are removed"). But see, Brother-
ton, supra note 121 ("[a]fter the cornea is removed, it is not returned and the corpse is perma-
nently diminished"). 
123. Federal law prohibits any person from receiving valuable consideration for acquir-
ing, receiving or transferring an organ for transplantation. See National Organ Transplant 
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2346 (1984). A similar prohibition is found in the 1987 
version of the UAGA. See UAGA(1987) § 10. 
124. The prohibition on the sale of organs also would preclude calculation of a fair mar-
ket value for the organs for purposes of establishing just compensation. See Columbia Note, 
supra note 9, at 571-72. 
125. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986). 
126. 497 So. 2d at 1192. While the court was construing the statute under the Florida 
constitution, the language of the state and federal constitutions, while different, presumably 
impose the same requirements. Compare U.S. CaNST., amend. V with FLA. CoNsr., art. X, 
§ 6 (1968 revision) ("[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with 
full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the 
court and available to the owner"). 
127. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 732.9185 (West 1990). 
128. Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985). In a 
brief dissent, one judge asserted that the failure of the statute to provide notice to the next of 
kin and "a realistic opportunity to object" violated due process. Id. at 129. Conceivably, an 
appropriate opting-out system would satisfy even this dissenter. 
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Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that state statutes per-
mitting removal of corneas did trigger due process requirements. 129 
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the hospital in which her hus-
band died had asked her for permission to harvest his organs, and 
that, based on her husband's wishes, she had refused. She further 
alleged that her refusal was recorded on the hospital's "Report of 
Death." The body was taken to the county coroner's office, and the 
corneas were removed. The hospital records did not accompany the 
body, so the coroner did not review the medical records or hospital 
paperwork to ascertain if an objection had been asserted. 130 The 
plaintiff discovered that the corneas had been removed when she 
read the autopsy report, and brought suit under section 1983 of title 
43 of the U.S. Code on the basis that the coroner's action had de-
prived her of a right secured under the U.S. Constitution. The 
court, with one judge dissenting, held that the plaintiff had an inter-
est in her husband's body that was protected under the due process 
clauses. This interest was premised on the provisions of the 
UAGA, which, according to the court, expressly gave the plaintiff 
the right "to control the disposal of Steven Brotherton's body," and 
on prior cases that recognized a nght in the spouse to possess the 
body and to recover damages against those who mishandle itY 1 
The opinion did not prescribe the procedural steps that the state 
was obliged to follow. For the most part, the court seems to focus 
on the coroner's failure to conduct even a minimal inquiry into 
whether or not the family objected to removal. The opinion refers 
to what it termed the coroner's "intentional ignorance," which was 
"induced" by the Ohio corneal removal statute. According to the 
court's opinion, this statute "allows the [coroner's] office to take 
corneas from the bodies of deceased without considering the interest 
of any other parties, as long as they have no knowledge of any ob-
jection to such a removal." 132 In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
the Ohio statute was amended in 1983 to delete a requirement that 
the coroner "make a reasonable effort to notify the family of the 
deceased." 133 Thus, the court might simply be saying that there 
must be some procedure for notifying the coroner when the hospital 
is aware of an objection, and that failure to do so is a violation of 
129. See Brotherton, supra note 121. 
130. Personal communication with Philip L. Zorn, Jr., Assistant Prosecutor, Cincinnati, 
Ohio (Feb. 22, 1991). 
131. !d. 
132. !d. 
133. H.B. 239, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-370 (Baldwin). 
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due process. If this was what the court had in mind, however, it 
could easily have said so. Instead, it remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings. Furthermore, in discussing the 
requirement of due process, the court pointed out that "[t]he 
Supreme Court has often reiterated that a property interest may not 
be destroyed without a hearing." 134 This suggests that the court 
would insist on a predeprivation hearing of some sort before corneas 
could be removed. 
If the Sixth Circuit is insisting that a formal hearing be held 
before organs could be donated, this could invalidate current dona-
tion procedures, including the donor card system provided for in 
the UAGA. Arguably, these procedures might not satisfy a formal 
hearing requirement, particularly if due process rights inhere in the 
family and given that the UAGA permits the donor's disposition to 
override the family's wishes. 
If removal of organs for transplantation under state law triggers 
due process requirements, and if this means that there must be an 
actual administrative or judicial hearing before organs can be re-
moved, then a presumed consent approach would be largely useless. 
Hearings would be expensive and cumbersome and would cause de-
lay that might reduce or eliminate the usefulness of the organs for 
transplantation purposes. More importantly, since the next-of-kin 
would be interested parties entitled to participate in the hearing, 
requiring a hearing would be tantamount to prohibiting removal of 
organs without express familial permission for donation. 
One way to avoid this result is for the Brotherton case to be 
overturned. The losing parties may petition the U.S. Supreme 
Court to review the case, and the Court may overrule the Court of 
Appeals. Even if the case is not overturned, it does not control the 
law in jurisdictions outside of the Sixth Circuit. 
Another approach would be for the Ohio legislature to state that 
the family possesses no property rights in the deceased other than 
those rights expressly granted under state law, or that the family 
has no property right that triggers due process requirements. Since 
Brotherton involves the imposition of due process requirements on 
state action through the fourteenth amendment, and since four-
teenth amendment rights are contingent on state law, 135 the impact 
of Brotherton could be avoided if the legislature clarified that it did 
134. Brotherton, supra note 121, at 10 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,455 U.S. 
422, 434 (1982). 
135. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
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not intend to create property-type rights when it passed the UAGA, 
or that whatever rights had inadvertently been created were extin-
guished.136 Finally, even if the decision in Brotherton were allowed 
to stand, it need not be read to preclude the adoption of a presumed 
consent approach so long as the system incorporated an effective 
opting-out mechanism. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court 
set forth the following balancing test to determine what process was 
required by the fifth amendment: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, ad-
ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute re-
quirement would entail. 137 
Given the limited nature of the private interest in donor organs and 
the public interest in increasing the supply of transplant organs, an 
opting-out system that reasonably reduced the risk of an unintended 
donation would be likely to satisfy the requirements of due pro-
cess. 138 Under such a system, the family would be deemed to have 
waived its rights to a "hearing" unless it objected to donation. Nor 
would a hearing be required in the event the family did not waive its 
right to one, since this would mean that the family had asserted an 
objection, that the organs would not be removed, and that therefore 
the family would not have its property rights diminished. In order 
for the opting-out system to satisfy due process in this fashion, how-
ever, it might be necessary to show that the family had received 
notice of the existence of the presumed consent system and had un-
derstood how it operated. This would entail a comprehensive edu-
cational program, and would probably require some sort of actual 
notification of the family, such as by posting a notice in hospitals 
and providing the family with written information. 
Apart from questions arising under the property clauses, the 
presumed consent law might be challenged on the ground that it 
deprived persons of liberty without due process as required by the 
fifth amendment. In State v. Powell, the Florida Supreme Court 
136. This might give rise to a claim that the state was "taking" property in dead bodies 
without just compensation. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text. 
137. 424 u.s. 319, 335 (1976). 
138. But see Brotherton, supra note 121, at 11 ("[t]he only governmental interest en-
hanced by the removal of the corneas is the interest in implementing the organ/tissue dona-
tion program; this interest is not substantial enough to allow the state to consciously 
disregard those property rights which it has granted"). 
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rejected the argument that the right of the next of kin to dispose of 
the body of a loved one amounted to the type of fundamental right 
protected under either the federal or state constitution. 139 Simi-
larly, an appellate court in Michigan rejected a fifth amendment 
argument against that state's cornea removal statute, holding that 
constitutional rights concerning the integrity of the body ended 
with death. 140 The recent decision in the Cruzan case, 141 in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state court's requirement of clear 
and convincing evidence before a person in a persistent vegetative 
state could be deprived of nutrition and hydration, is further evi-
dence that liberty interests will be narrowly construed in cases in-
volving the rights of persons who are no longer competent to make 
their own decisions, and perhaps in cases involving the rights of 
their families as well. 
Constitutional objections to presumed consent laws also might 
be asserted on first amendment grounds. The court in State v. Pow-
ell expressly noted that the plaintiffs had not alleged that their ob-
jection to the removal of corneal tissues was based on religious 
convictions, 142 suggesting that the case might have come out differ-
ently if they had. As discussed earlier, however, a well-designed 
opting-out system that permitted religious objections to block organ 
retrieval ought to avoid the first amendment's ban on laws prohibit-
ing the free exercise of religion. 143 
2. Civil and Criminal Liability 
Apart from confronting constitutional issues, persons who re-
moved organs without express permission from the decedent or the 
family might be concerned that they could be subject to criminal 
and civil liability. State law generally makes it a crime to mutilate 
or to mistreat a corpse. 144 The term "mistreatment" is usually de-
fined as an act that offends or outrages ordinary sensibilities. While 
removing organs for transplantation need not leave the corpse in a 
condition at the time of burial or cremation in which it appears to 
139. 497 So. 2d at 1193. The court held that the constitution only recognized rights in-
volving relationships between living persons. Jd. 
140. Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hasp., 138 Mich. App. 683, 687, 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 
(1984). 
141. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990). 
142. 497 So. 2d at 1193. 
143. See Silver, supra note 7, at 709-12; Hamline Note, supra note 92, at 360-63. 
144. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 7052 (West 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 272, § 71 (West 1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 4218 (McKinney 1990); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01 (Baldwin 1991). 
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have been mutilated, it may be deemed to have been mistreated if 
removal without express permission is regarded as offensive or 
outrageous. 
Removing organs under a presumed consent approach might 
also give rise to civil liability for tortious interference with the right 
of burial. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, which attempts to 
codify the common law, states that "[o]ne who intentionally, reck-
lessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon 
the body of a dead person or prevents its proper internment or cre-
mation is subject to liability to a member of the family of the de-
ceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body." 145 The family 
might seek damages on the theory that removing organs without 
express permission was an intentional operation upon the deceased. 
In a recent Florida decision, Kirker v. Orange County, 146 a state 
appellate court held that the mother of a deceased child stated a 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress when 
she alleged that the county medical examiner had removed the 
child's eyes over the mother's objection. The mother claimed that 
she discovered that the eyes had been removed after she noticed at 
the funeral that the eyes appeared depressed. Furthermore, she as-
serted that the child's attending physician had asked for permission 
to remove the child's corneas and kidneys, that the mother had re-
fused, and that the refusal had been noted on the child's hospital 
chart. Finally, the mother claimed that the medical examiner had 
been aware of her objection and had attempted to cover up the un-
authorized removal by falsifying the autopsy report. 147 
The Kirker case is distinguishable on its facts from a presumed 
consent case in which the body is returned to the family without 
visible signs of organ removal, in which no express objection to re-
moval has been made by the decedent or the family, and in which 
no attempt has been made to conceal unauthorized behavior. In a 
recent Tennessee case, Hinze v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 148 the 
court held that an eye bank and a hospital had not violated the 
UAGA by removing a decedent's eyes without permission when the 
decedent had not refused donation, the hospital had obtained writ-
145. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979). 
146. 519 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
147. 519 So. 2d at 682-83. The charge of a cover-up was based on the allegation that the 
autopsy report described the child's eyes as blue and as having a certain size and shape when 
the child's eyes in fact were brown and had been removed prior to the autopsy. 
148. No. 27253 T.R. Tennessee Court of Appeals, Western Section, Aug. 23, 1990, re-
ported in I 8 HEALTH L. DIG. 13 (Oct. 1990). 
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ten consent from someone purporting to be the decedent's grandson 
and representing himself as authorized to consent, and the hospital 
had not been given actual notice that anyone authorized to consent 
had objected. The facts showed that the defendants had not acted 
in bad faith, and, under the UAGA, good faith is a defense. 149 
Good faith compliance with a presumed consent law similarly 
might avoid liability under the approach in Kirker. 150 
Nevertheless, the court in Kirker characterizes the family's right 
of burial in such broad terms that even those who acted in good 
faith in removing organs might be liable for damages. The court 
states that the right of action for mutilating a corpse is based on the 
right of the surviving family members to bury the body "in the con-
dition found when life became extinct."151 Arguably, a body whose 
organs had been removed for transplantation, even though without 
any visible signs that this had been done, would no longer be in the 
same condition as at the time of death. Furthermore, the opinion 
notes that "[t]he courts are not primarily concerned with the extent 
of the mishandling or injury to the body, per se, 'but rather with the 
effect of the same on the feelings and emotions of the surviving rela-
tives, who have the right to burial.' " 152 This suggests that family 
members who were foreseeably distressed upon learning that organs 
had been removed from their next of kin without express permission 
might be able to recover for their emotional upset regardless of the 
manner in which the organs had been removed and regardless of the 
appearance of the corpse. 153 
The possibility that physicians and hospitals who complied with 
presumed consent legislation nevertheless might be subject to civil 
and criminal liability can be eliminated, however, by enacting care-
fully drafted immunity provisions as part of the legislation. Such 
provisions should not only contain general protection for good faith 
149. See UAGA(I968) § 7(c) ("[a] person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms 
of this Act ... is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any 
criminal proceeding for his act"). The 1987 version of the UAGA, which was not involved in 
Hinze, insulates a person from liability if he or she "attempts in good faith" to act in accord-
ance with the statute. UAGA(I987) § ll(c). 
150. The plaintiff in Kirker does not appear to have alleged a violation of the UAGA. 
151. 519 So. 2d at 684, quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D, D~d Bodies, §§ 31, 32 (1965). 
152. 519 So. 2d at 684, quoting Jackson v. Rupp, 228 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1969), affirmed 238 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1970); see also Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 
(Fla. 1950). 
153. To recover, however, the plaintiffs would have to show that they were not peculiarly 
susceptible to emotional distress but rather, that the defendants had acted in a manner that 
would outrage ordinary sensibilities. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 46 (intentional 
or reckless infliction of emotional distress). 
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behavior, as in the UAGA, 154 but should spell out precisely what 
steps providers must take to verify the absence of an objection to 
donation in order to satisfy the good faith criterion. 
D. Public Opposition 
As noted earlier, public opposition was cited by the HHS Task 
Force on Organ Transplantation in 1986 as the sole basis for re-
jecting the presumed consent approach. 155 An article in the Journal 
of The American Medical Association in 1985 reported, for example, 
that presumed consent "would not be very popular among the 
American public."156 This conclusion was based on a survey find-
ing that "an overwhelming majority of Americans (86.5 percent of 
all respondents surveyed) believe that physicians should not have 
the power to remove organs from people who have died and who 
have not signed an organ donor card without consulting the next of 
kin."l57 
In fact, the survey reported in JAMA is the only opinion poll to 
report that the public is opposed to presumed consent. It is widely 
believed that the Gallup organization, which routinely conducts 
public opinion surveys on public attitudes toward organ donation, 
has reported similar results. 158 However, the closest that the Gal-
lup poll has come to inquiring about attitudes toward presumed 
consent is when it asked respondents in its 1985 and 1986 surveys if 
they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "Even if I have never 
given anyone permission, I wouldn't mind if my organs were 
donated upon my death."159 The question used by Gallup does not 
make it clear whether or not organs would be donated only if the 
family had been asked, and therefore the responses cannot be said to 
bear directly on the respondent's attitudes toward presumed con-
sent. Nevertheless, the fact that 62 percent of respondents in 1985 
and 61 percent in 1986 stated that they would want their organs 
donated even without their ever having given permission can hardly 
be construed as opposition to presumed consent. 
This leaves the report in JAMA as the only survey that claims to 
demonstrate public opposition to presumed consent. Yet the valid-
154. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
156. Manninen and Evans, supra note 13, at 3114. 
157. /d. 
158. Personal communication from Stuart Youngner, M.D., Center for Biomedical Eth-
ics, Case Western Reserve University (Jan. 2, 1991). 
159. Gallup Poll 1985, supra note 71, at VII; Gallup Poll 1986, id. at iv. 
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ity of its findings is questionable. The question that was asked 
about attitudes toward presumed consent apparently was: "Should 
doctors have the power to remove organs from people who have 
died but have not signed an organ donor card without consulting 
the next of kin?" 160 The question made no mention of the possibil-
ity of opting-out. Respondents may have assumed that no objection 
could be made to donation. The question therefore may have elic-
ited negative attitudes toward a system of mandatory harvesting 
without a right of refusal, rather than toward a system of presumed 
consent. In addition, it appears that the survey asked the "pre-
sumed consent" question after it had asked respondents about their 
willingness to donate their own organs, and that the question about 
donating one's own organs was asked after a question about willing-
ness to donate the organs of a relative. 161 It is well-known that peo-
ple report a greater willingness to donate someone else's organs 
than their own. 162 Therefore, the questions appear to have been 
asked in an order that was likely to produce a decreasing percentage 
of positive responses, which may well have biased the results. 
In short, public attitudes toward presumed consent presently are 
unknown. It is conceivable that an unbiased survey that explained 
the operation of an opting-out system and then asked if respondents 
would agree that organs could be removed if neither the decedent 
nor the next of kin had registered an objection would reveal a large 
degree of support. Depending on how the question were asked, sup-
port for presumed consent might well come close to the level of 
strong support for donating one's own organs, which, according to 
Gallup polls, has hovered around only 30 percent over the last five 
years. 163 
In fact, if public opinion polls reveal anything, it is that the pub-
160. Manninen and Evans, supra note 13, at 3113. The authors of the report describe the 
presumed consent question as quoted in the above texi, but do not state that this was the 
actual form of the question. 
161. At least, this is the order in which the results of the survey are reported. See id. at 
3112-13. 
162. See id. at 3111 (53 percent willing to donate relative's organs while 50 percent will-
ing to donate own organs). The Gallup organization reported in 1985 that, while 73 percent 
of respondents stated that they were very likely to donate the organs of a relative, only 27 
percent were very likely to donate their own organs. Gallup Poll 1985, supra note 71, at IV. 
The results for 1986 were 70 percent very likely to donate the organs of relatives, 32 percent 
very likely to donate their own. Gallup Poll 1986, id. at iii. The results in 1987 were 66 
percent and 30 percent. Gallup Poll 1987, id. at 2, 5 (author's pagination). The form of 
questions changed for the 1990 survey, with 78 percent reporting that they were very likely to 
donate the organs of a relative and 28 percent reporting that they were very likely to donate 
their own organs. Gallup Poll 1990, id. at 2 (author's pagination). 
163. See id. 
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lie by and large seems to be upset by the notion of death and the 
prospect of removal of organs for transplantation, and would rather 
not be confronted with having to think about it. A presumed con-
sent program that did not force people to consider these issues 
might be relatively noncontroversial, as appears to be the case with 
state statutes permitting medical examiners to remove corneas and 
pituitaries without consent. 164 Most people are probably unaware, 
for example, that after a man dies, string is tied around his penis, 
cotton is stuffed up his rectum and his body is exsanguinated before 
burial. 165 If told about it, people might well be uncomfortable 
about being told, rather than about what was done. 
Removal of organs for transplantation does raise one particular 
concern in the minds of some members of the public that might be 
exacerbated by a presumed consent approach. There are people 
who are afraid that "over-zealous" organ procurers might pro-
nounce them dead prematurely or even hasten their deaths to obtain 
their organs.166 For example, the 1985 Gallup poll found that 20 
percent of respondents who did not want to give permission for 
their organs to be removed rated as a very important reason the fear 
that "doctors might hasten my death if they needed my organs," 
while 23 percent rated as very important the possibility that "they 
might do something to me before I am really dead." 167 This is a 
fear created by organ donation programs in general. However, a 
presumed consent system might be especially suspect because elimi-
nating the need to get permission from the family might be seen as 
reducing the ability of the family to protect patients from unscrupu-
lous physicians. 168 
The UAGA deals with this concern by prohibiting either the 
attending physician at the time of death or the physician who deter-
mines the time of death from participating in the removal or trans-
plantation of organs. 169 Additional safeguards might be needed 
under a presumed consent approach if these protections were re-
garded as insufficient. 
164. See HASTINGS CENTER, ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES PERTAINING TO 
SoLID ORGAN PROCUREMENT 20 (1985) ("weak presumed consent laws pertaining to cor-
neas have generated little controversy in those states that have adopted them"). 
165. See Dukeminier and Sanders, supra note 7, at 416. 
166. See Naylor, supra note 6, at 168, 186. 
167. Gallup Poll 1985, supra note 71, at VII. 
168. See Naylor, supra note 6, at 186. 
169. See UAGA(1968) § 7(b). The 1987 version will allow either of these two physicians 
to participate in removal or transplant of organs if the document of gift designates that partic-
ular physician or surgeon. UAGA(1987) § 8(b). 
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V. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 
Assuming that presumed consent is viewed as an attractive theo-
retical possibility, policymakers must address a number of practical 
difficulties before it can become a reality and be expected signifi-
cantly to increase the supply of transplant organs. One critical prob-
lem has been discussed earlier: the need to design an effective 
opting-out system that would permit large numbers of organs to be 
removed at the same time that it comported with ethical, religious 
and due process requirements. A lingering question is whether 
adopting a presumed consent approach would produce a change in 
provider behavior. As noted above, the unwillingness of physicians 
and hospital staff to approach families to seek consent was the ma-
jor reason for the failure of encouraged voluntarism, and also has 
been blamed for the lack of success of required request. The French 
and Belgian experience suggests that providers might continue to 
insist on express familial consent even if a presumed consent law 
were enacted. 
Careful design of the opting-out system and drafting of immu-
nity provisions may help to alleviate provider concerns. 170 Greater 
information about how presumed consent works in Austria may 
suggest ways of reducing provider resistance. The key is likely to be 
a successful educational campaign aimed at providers. 171 However, 
it is unclear how these efforts could be made more successful under 
a presumed consent approach than they have been under required 
request. 
Finally, an attempt to enact presumed consent legislation would 
have to overcome significant political obstacles. Politicians would 
need to be convinced that increasing the supply of transplant organs 
was important and worth taking some political risks. The design of 
the opting-out system would have to mollify religious and ethics 
lobbies. Public opinion polls either would have to be redone in a 
less biased fashion, or disregarded. The provider and hospital com-
munities would have to be mobilized in favor of the proposal. The 
170. Another approach would be to impose civil, criminal or regulatory sanctions on 
providers who did not harvest organs in the absence of an objection by the decedent or the 
family. Medicare's requirement that hospitals establish required request policies in order to 
qualify for Medicare reimbursement is a step in this direction. However, providers are likely 
to oppose an attempt to enact such penalties, and it is doubtful that presumed consent legisla-
tion could be passed without strong provider support. 
171. See Caplan, supra note 48, at 37, for an argument that educational efforts aimed at 
providers rather than at the public are what is needed to increase donations under required 
request. For a discussion of the need for educational programs in connection with the move-
ment to adopt required request, see 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 22, at 45-49. 
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public would have to be persuaded that presumed consent would 
not result in premature deaths. In short, passage of presumed con-
sent legislation would require a massive and highly sophisticated 
lobbying effort. 
The most promising approach might be to try to enact a pre-
sumed consent approach on an experimental basis in a single state. 
Legislation would be needed to suspend conflicting provisions of the 
UAGA and to provide immunity from liability. Lobbying efforts 
could highlight actual persons in need of lifesaving transplants, and 
emphasize the econoniic benefits of transplantation. After a suffi-
cient amount of time, the success of the experiment could be as-
sessed in terms of the effect on the number of organs available for 
transplantation. Dramatic, positive results could lead to adoption 
of presumed consent legislation in other jurisdictions, and eventu-
ally to uniform state laws along the lines of the required request 
system embodied in the 1987 version of the UAGA. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the benefits expected from an increased availability of ca-
daveric organs for transplantation, and in view of the shortcomings 
of the current required request approach to donation, it is worth-
while to conduct further research on a system of presumed consent. 
Research is necessary in order adequately to assess the merits and 
feasibility of presumed consent, and to design a system that would 
fulfill ethical, religious and legal requirements. The following spe-
cific areas for further research have been identified: 
1) Designing an opting-out system that would enable per-
sons who objected to donation to refuse to donate in a manner 
that was sensitive to the feelings of patients and their families, 
that was efficient and cost-effective, and that met religious, eth-
ical and legal requirements. 
2) Designing an educational program for both providers 
and the public that addressed their concerns and that educated 
them about the benefits and operation of a presumed consent 
approach. 
3) Designing and executing a public opinion survey that 
ascertained reactions to an appropriately designed presumed 
consent system. 
